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Abstract
In this study, we develop a search-and-matching monetary growth model to analyze
the e¤ects of ination on economic growth and social welfare by introducing endoge-
nous economic growth via capital externality into a two-sector search-and-matching
model. We nd that the channel through which ination a¤ects economic growth in
the search-and-matching model is di¤erent from the traditional cash-in-advance model.
To facilitate the calibration, we obtain an empirical estimate of the e¤ects of ination
on economic growth using panel regressions. In the simulation analysis, we quantita-
tively evaluate the welfare e¤ect of ination in the search-and-matching endogenous
growth model and compare it to a search-and-matching exogenous growth model. We
nd that the welfare e¤ect of ination is nonlinear in the endogenous growth model
whereas it is linear in the exogenous growth model. Furthermore, we nd that the
welfare cost of ination under endogenous growth is up to four times as large as the
welfare cost of ination under exogenous growth.
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1 Introduction
In this study, we analyze the e¤ects of ination and monetary policy on economic growth
and social welfare. Although this important issue in monetary economics has received much
attention and careful analysis in previous studies, our analysis provides novel elements and
results. To highlight the novelty of this study, it is helpful to rst discuss two related
branches of literature in monetary economics. First, this study relates to the search-and-
matching literature on money and capital formation; see for example, Shi (1999), Menner
(2006), Williamson and Wright (2010), Aruoba et al. (2011), Bencivenga and Camera (2011)
and Waller (2011). This branch of literature analyzes the relationship between money and
capital formation in a search-theoretic framework without considering economic growth as
an endogenous process. Second, this study also relates to the branch of literature on ination
and economic growth; see for example, Wang and Yip (1992), Gomme (1993), Dotsey and
Ireland (1996), Mino (1997) and more recently, Itaya and Mino (2003, 2007) and Lai and
Chin (2010).1 This branch of literature analyzes the growth and welfare e¤ects of ination by
modeling money demand based on the classical approach, such as a cash-in-advance (CIA)
constraint, money in utility and transaction costs, without considering a search-and-matching
framework. In this study, we attempt to provide a bridge between these two branches of
literature by analyzing the growth and welfare e¤ects of ination in a search-and-matching
monetary growth model. In summary, we introduce endogenous economic growth via capital
externality as in Romer (1986) into a two-sector search-and-matching model based on Lagos
and Wright (2005), Aruoba et al. (2011) and Waller (2011).2 In this search-and-matching
monetary growth model, we obtain the following results that have novel implications to the
two abovementioned branches of literature.
In a canonical monetary growth model with a CIA constraint on consumption, ination
a¤ects economic growth via the consumption-leisure tradeo¤. In other words, in the case
of inelastic labor supply, ination has no e¤ect on economic growth in the CIA model. In
contrast, in the search-and-matching monetary growth model, the growth e¤ects of ination
operate through a consumption e¤ect in the decentralized market. Intuitively, a higher ina-
tion rate increases the cost of holding money and reduces consumption in the decentralized
market that requires the use of money for transactions. As a result of lower consumption in
the decentralized market, capital demand decreases causing a reduction in capital accumu-
lation and economic growth regardless of whether or not labor supply is elastic.
To facilitate the calibration of the model, we use cross-country panel data to provide
an empirical estimation and nd that ination has a statistically signicant negative direct
e¤ect on economic growth as well as a statistically signicant negative indirect e¤ect on
economic growth through the reduction of capital investment. Then, we use these estimates
as an empirical moment to calibrate the model in order to quantitatively evaluate the welfare
e¤ects of ination. We compare the welfare e¤ects of ination under the search-and-matching
endogenous growth model to those from a search-and-matching exogenous growth model
1There is also a sub-branch of this literature that analyzes the relationship between ination and
innovation-driven economic growth; see for example, Marquis and Re¤ett (1994), Chu and Lai (2013) and
Chu and Cozzi (2013).
2A recent study by Chiu et al. (2011) also provides an interesting analysis on the e¤ects of nancial and
search frictions on economic growth, but they do not consider money and ination.
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similar to Aruoba et al. (2011) and Waller (2011) in order to highlight the importance of
modelling economic growth as an endogenous process. We nd that the welfare e¤ect of
ination is nonlinear in the endogenous growth model,3 whereas it is linear in the exogenous
growth model. We discuss the intuition of this result in the main text.4 Interestingly, we
also nd that the welfare cost of ination under endogenous growth is up to four times
as large as the welfare cost of ination under exogenous growth partly because reducing
ination increases the long-run growth rate in the endogenous growth model but not in the
exogenous growth model. Furthermore, given that the welfare e¤ect of ination is nonlinear
in the endogenous growth model, the di¤erence in the welfare costs of ination across the
two models is increasing in the size of the change in the money growth rate.
The rest of this study is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the search-and-matching
monetary growth model. Section 3 analyzes the e¤ects of ination on economic growth and
social welfare. In Section 4, we calibrate the model to provide a quantitative analysis. The
nal section concludes.
2 A search-and-matching monetary growth model
The two-sector search-and-matching model is based on Lagos and Wright (2005). Aruoba
et al. (2011) extend the Lagos-Wright model by introducing capital accumulation, whereas
Waller (2011) further extends the model in Aruoba et al. (2011) by allowing for exogenous
technological progress. Our model is based on Waller (2011), but we introduce capital
externality into his model to generate endogenous economic growth. In what follows, we
describe the basic features of the search-and-matching monetary growth model.
2.1 Households
There is a unit measure of identical and innitely-lived households in discrete time. In each
period, households engage in economic activities rst in the decentralized market (hereafter
DM) and then in the centralized market (hereafter CM). The DM and the CM are distin-
guished as follows. In each period t, households rst enter the DM where they consume or
produce special goods qt. In this market, each meeting is random and anonymous so that
money becomes essential.5 Once the round of DM trade is completed, households proceed
3Chiu and Molico (2010) also nd that in a modied version of the Lagos-Wright model with endogenous
participation in the centralized market, the welfare e¤ect of ination is nonlinear in contrast to the linear
welfare e¤ect of ination in the original Lagos-Wright model.
4See Section 4.3 for a discussion. In an earlier version of this paper (see Chu et al. (2012)), we compare
quantitatively the welfare e¤ects of ination between the search-and-matching model and a CIA model. We
nd that the welfare e¤ect is in fact linear in the CIA model even with endogenous growth. Therefore, the
nonlinear welfare e¤ect in our model is due to a combination of endogenous growth and the search-and-
matching structure.
5Following the standard approach in the literature, we assume that capital cannot serve as a medium of
exchange; see Williamson and Wright (2010) and Aruoba et al. (2011) for a useful discussion. Lagos and
Rocheteau (2008) show that even when capital serves as a competing medium of exchange, at money can
still be valued and used as a medium of exchange.
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to the CM where they consume and produce general goods as in standard growth models.
Following the common approach in the literature, we assume that there is no discounting
between the DM and the CM within each period, and the discount factor between any two
consecutive periods is  2 (0; 1). In what follows, we rst discuss householdsoptimization
in the CM.
2.1.1 Householdsoptimization in the CM
In the CM, households have an instantaneous utility function ut = B lnxt   Aht, which is
increasing in the consumption of general goods xt and decreasing in the supply of labor ht.
The parameters A > 0 and B > 0 determine respectively the disutility of labor supply and
the importance of consumption.6 Let W (mt; kt) and V (mt; kt) denote the period-t value
functions for households in the CM and the DM respectively. mt is the nominal money
balance and kt is the capital stock owned by households in period t. The maximization
problem of households in the CM can be expressed as
W (mt; kt) = max
xt;ht;mt+1;kt+1
[B lnxt   Aht + V (mt+1; kt+1)] (1)
subject to a sequence of budget constraints given by
kt+1 +
mt+1
pt
= wtht + (1 + rt   )kt + mt
pt
+  t   xt. (2)
pt is the price of general goods. wt is the real wage rate (denominated in units of general
goods). rt is the rental price of capital. The parameter  2 (0; 1) is the depreciation rate of
capital.  t is a real lump-sum transfer from the government.
From standard optimization, the optimality condition for consumption in the CM is
B
xt
=
A
wt
. (3)
Equation (3) implies that all households consume the same amount of general goods xt in
the CM regardless of their holdings of capital and money. This useful property results from
the quasi-linear utility function, which is a standard simplifying assumption in this branch
of model to eliminate any dispersion in money holdings that arises from trades in the DM.7
The standard intertemporal optimality conditions for the accumulation of capital and money
are respectively
B
xt
= Vk(mt+1; kt+1), (4)
B
ptxt
= Vm(mt+1; kt+1). (5)
6Following Aruoba et al. (2011), we include the parameter B in order to match the money-consumption
ratio in the calibration.
7See for example, Rocheteau and Wright (2005) and Aruoba et al. (2011) for a useful discussion.
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Equations (3) to (5) imply that all households enter the DM in the next period with the
same holdings of capital and money. In addition, the familiar envelope conditions are
Wk(mt; kt) =
B (1 + rt   )
xt
, (6)
Wm(mt; kt) =
B
ptxt
. (7)
2.1.2 Householdsoptimization in the DM
In the DM, a household either becomes (a) a buyer, (b) a seller or (c) a nontrader. The
probability of becoming a buyer is  2 (0; 0:5), and the probability of becoming a seller
is also  2 (0; 0:5). The probability of becoming a nontrader is 1   2 > 0. As  ! 0,
monetary policy would have no e¤ects on economic growth and social welfare. This taste-
and-technology-shock specication shows a random matching technology that buyers meet
with sellers and is a standard feature of the Lagos-Wright model.8 As a result of this taste-
and-technology shock, the value of entering the DM is
V (mt; kt) = V
b(mt; kt) + V
s(mt; kt) + (1  2)W (mt; kt), (8)
where V b(:) and V s(:) are the values of being a buyer and a seller respectively.
To analyze V b(:) and V s(:), we consider the following functional forms for the buyers
preference and the sellersproduction technology. In the DM, each buyers utility ln qbt is
increasing and concave in the consumption of special goods. Each seller produces special
goods qst by combining her capital kt and e¤ort et subject to the following Cobb-Douglas
production function.
qst = z
1 
t k

t e

t , (9)
where zt denotes aggregate technology. To achieve endogenous growth, we will follow Romer
(1986) to assume that capital has a positive externality e¤ect on aggregate technology such
that zt = kt, where kt is the aggregate holding of capital in the economy.9 The parameter
 2 (0; 1) determines capital share. To ensure constant returns to scale, we will impose
 = 1  on labor share; however, it would be useful for us to rst present the analysis with
 in order to isolate the e¤ects of capital and labor shares.
Rewriting equation (9), we can express the utility cost of production as
e

qst
zt
;
kt
zt

=

qst
zt
1= 
kt
zt
 =
. (10)
Buyers purchase special goods qbt by spending money d
b
t , whereas sellers earn money d
s
t by
producing special goods qst .
10 Given these terms of trade, the values of being a buyer and a
8See Corbae et al. (2002) for a model of endogenous matching as an alternative to random matching.
9It is useful to note that kt = kt in equilibrium.
10As a result of these di¤erent money holdings at the end of the DM, households supply di¤erent amounts
of labor in the CM to eliminate any dispersion in money holdings.
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seller are respectively11
V b(mt; kt) = ln q
b
t +W (mt   dbt ; kt), (11)
V s(mt; kt) =  e

qst
zt
;
kt
zt

+W (mt + d
s
t ; kt). (12)
Di¤erentiating (11) and (12) and substituting them into (8), we can obtain the following
envelope condition for mt.
Vm(mt; kt) = (1  2)Wm(mt; kt) + 

1
qbt
@qbt
@mt
+Wm(mt   dbt ; kt)

1  @d
b
t
@mt

(13)
+

 e1

qst
zt
;
kt
zt

1
zt
@qst
@mt
+Wm(mt + d
s
t ; kt)

1 +
@dst
@mt

,
where Wm(mt; kt) = Wm(mt   dbt ; kt) = Wm(mt + dst ; kt) = B=(ptxt) from (7). Similarly, we
can obtain the following envelope condition for kt:
Vk(mt; kt) = (1  2)Wk(mt; kt) + 

1
qbt
@qbt
@kt
 Wm(mt   dbt ; kt)
@dbt
@kt
+Wk(mt   dbt ; kt)

(14)
+

 e1

qst
zt
;
kt
zt

1
zt
@qst
@kt
  e2

qst
zt
;
kt
zt

1
zt
+Wm(mt + d
s
t ; kt)
@dst
@kt
+Wk(mt + d
s
t ; kt)

,
where Wk(mt; kt) = Wk(mt   dbt ; kt) = Wk(mt + dst ; kt) = B(1 + rt   )=xt from (6).
To solve the marginal value of holding money (13) and capital (14), we consider a com-
petitive equilibrium with price taking as in Aruoba et al. (2011) and Waller (2011).12 Under
price taking, once buyers and sellers are matched, they both act as price takers. Given the
price ept of special goods, buyers choose qbt to maximize
V b(mt; kt) = max
qbt
[ln qbt +W (mt   eptqbt ; kt)] (15)
subject to the budget constraint
dbt = eptqbt  mt. (16)
In the DM, buyers spend all their money,13 so that the money constraint implies that
qbt = mt=ept. (17)
11Adding a disutility parameter to the supply of e¤ort in the DM would not change our qualitative and
quantitative results. Therefore, we follow Aruoba et al. (2011) and Waller (2011) to normalize this parameter
to unity.
12In addition to the competitive equilibrium with price taking, Aruoba et al. (2011) and Waller (2011)
also consider bargaining between buyers and sellers to determine the terms of trade. In this study, we focus
on the competitive equilibrium with price taking because of economic growth. In the case of generalized
Nash bargaining as in Aruoba et al. (2011) or proportional bargaining as in Waller (2011), the bargaining
condition is incompatible with balanced growth because the buyersutility, which determines their surplus, is
increasing overtime due to economic growth whereas the sellersdisutility of e¤ort is stationary on a balanced
growth path. In Appendix A, we demonstrate this problem under proportional bargaining and show that
only a special case in which buyers gain all surplus is consistent with balanced growth; however, under this
special case, ination has no e¤ect on economic growth because sellers obtain zero surplus in the DM.
13See Appendix B for a proof. Intuitively, due to the opportunity cost of holding money and the possibility
of not being a buyer in the DM, households do not carry a su¢ cient amount of money to the DM. Therefore,
if a household turns out to be a buyer in the DM, it would be optimal to spend all the money on qbt .
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As for sellersmaximization problem in the DM, it is given by
V s(mt; kt) = max
qst

 e

qst
zt
;
kt
zt

+W (mt + eptqst ; kt) . (18)
Sellersoptimal supplies of special goods can be obtained from the following condition.
e1

qst
zt
;
kt
zt

1
zt
= eptWm(mt + eptqst ; kt), 1e

qst
zt
;
kt
zt

= B
eptqst
ptxt
, (19)
where the second equality of (19) makes use of (7) and (10).
Using (17) and (19), we can obtain @qbt=@mt = 1=ept, @dbt=@mt = 1, and @dst=@kt =ept (@qst =@kt), whereas the other partial derivatives, @qbt=@kt, @dbt=@kt, @qst =@mt and @dst=@mt,
in (13) and (14) are zero. Substituting these conditions, qbt = q
s
t = qt and (19) into (13) and
(14), we can derive the following conditions.
Vm(mt; kt) =
B (1  )
ptxt
+
eptqt , (20)
Vk(mt; kt) =
B (1 + rt   )
xt
  
zt
e2

qt
zt
;
kt
zt

. (21)
Intuitively, (20) states that the marginal benet of holding money is the sum of the marginal
utility from being able to consume special goods with probability  (i.e., the household
becomes a buyer in the DM) and the marginal utility from spending the money, which is
also a valuable asset in the CM, on general goods with probability 1   (i.e., the household
does not become a buyer in the DM). Equation (21) states that the marginal benet of
holding capital is the sum of the marginal utility from spending the capital return 1 + rt  
on general goods in the CM and the expected marginal utility from having to exert less
e¤ort (recall that e2 < 0) in producing special goods in the DM with probability  (i.e., the
household becomes a seller in the DM).14
2.2 Firms in the CM
General goods are produced by using capital kt and production labor ht with the following
Cobb-Douglas production function.
yx;t = z
1 
t k

t h

t , (22)
where aggregate technology is zt = kt as before. The producers act competitively by tak-
ing output and input prices as given. The conditional demand functions for capital and
production labor are respectively
rt = z
1 
t k
 1
t h

t , (23)
wt = z
1 
t k

t h
 1
t . (24)
14Following Aruoba et al. (2011) and Waller (2011), we assume that the stock of capital does not depreciate
within a period even upon usage in the DM. Capital depreciation only occurs at the end of a period after
usage in the CM.
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2.3 Monetary authority
Let t = (mt+1  mt)=mt denote the growth rate of money supply that is exogenously set
by the monetary authority. Given the denition of real money balance mt=pt (denominated
in units of general goods), its evolution can then be expressed as
mt+1
pt+1
=

1 + t
1 + t

mt
pt
, (25)
where t is the ination rate that is endogenous and determines the cost of holding money.
In each period, the monetary authority issues money to nance a lump-sum transfer that
has a real value of  t = (mt+1  mt)=pt = tmt=pt.
2.4 Competitive equilibrium
The competitive equilibrium is a sequence of allocations fht; xt; yx;t; qt; dt;mt+1; kt+1g1t=0, a
sequence of prices fwt; rt; pt; ept; tg1t=0 and a sequence of policies ft;  tg1t=0. Also, in each
period, the following conditions hold.
 In the CM, households choose fht; xt;mt+1; kt+1g to maximize (1) subject to (2) taking
fwt; rt; pt;  tg as given;
 In the DM, buyers and sellers choose fqt; dtg to maximize utility taking feptg as given;
 Competitive rms in the CM produce fyx;tg to maximize prot taking fwt; rtg as given;
 The real value of aggregate consumption includes consumption in the CM and the DM
such that ct  (ptxt + eptqt)=pt;
 The real value of aggregate output includes output in the CM and the DM such that
yt  (ptyx;t + eptqt)=pt;
 The capital stock accumulates through investment from general goods such that kt+1 =
yx;t   xt + (1  )kt;
 The monetary authority balances its budget such that  t = tmt=pt.
2.5 Balanced growth path
In this subsection, we consider the dynamic properties of the model. Given that the monetary
authority sets a stationary growth rate of money supply (i.e., t =  for all t), Proposition
1 shows that the economy jumps to a unique and locally stable balanced growth path. The
proof is relegated to Appendix C. Given this balanced growth behavior of the model, we
analyze the e¤ects of monetary policy on the balanced growth path in the next section.
Proposition 1 Given a stationary sequence of monetary policy (i.e., t =  for all t), the
economy jumps to a unique and stable balanced growth path.
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3 Growth and welfare e¤ects of monetary policy
In this section, we analyze the e¤ects of monetary policy on the balanced growth path along
which the supply of labor is stationary. Given the equilibrium condition kt = kt, variables,
such as output, consumption, capital and real money balance, exhibit a common growth rate
g. Using (4), (10) and (21), we obtain
g  xt+1
xt
  1 = 

1 + r    + 
B
fcf
1=
d

  1, (26)
where r = h from (23). The variables fc  x=k and fd  q=k denote the consumption-
capital ratios in the CM and the DM respectively.
We rst make use of (5), (10), (19), (20) and (25) to derive the steady-state consumption-
capital ratio in the DM. We obtain
fd =


(1 + )=   (1  )

. (27)
fd must be positive because  >    1 > (1   )   1.15 Equation (27) shows that the
consumption-capital ratio in the DM is decreasing in the growth rate of money supply, and
this result can be shown as follows.
@fd
@
=  

()
[(1 + )=   (1  )]1+ < 0. (28)
Intuitively, a higher money growth rate increases ination, which in turn increases the cost
of consumption in the DM, where money is needed for transactions.
As for the steady-state consumption-capital ratio in the CM, we make use of (23), (24),
(26) and the capital-accumulation equation kt+1 = yx;t   xt + (1  )kt to derive
fc =
(1  )h + (1  )(1  )
1 + f
1=
d = (B)
, (29)
where aggregate labor h is still an endogenous variable and can be determined with the
following condition.
Ah1 fc = B, (30)
which uses (3) and (24). We use (30) to derive
@fc
@
=  B(1  )
Ah2 
@h
@
. (31)
As for the derivative of h, we substitute (27) and (30) into (29) and then take the di¤erentials
of h with respect to  to obtain
dh
d
=   (f
1=
d =)
2
A(1  ) + (1  )

B + f
1=
d =

=h
< 0. (32)
15It can be shown that as !    1, the nominal interest rate approaches the lower bound of zero. Here
the nominal interest rate refers to the nominal rate of return on a conventional interest-bearing bond that
pays interests in the CM (but not in the DM) of each period.
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Substituting (32) into (31) shows that @fc=@ > 0. In summary, a higher money growth
rate induces households to increase leisure and shift consumption from the DM to the CM.
Substituting (29) into (26), we obtain
g = h +
(1  )h + (1  )(1  )
1 +B=(f
1=
d )
+ (1  )  1. (33)
From (33), it is easy to see that the growth rate g is decreasing in  because @h=@ < 0
and @fd=@ < 0. Intuitively, ination a¤ects consumption in the DM, which in turn a¤ects
capital accumulation via two channels. The rst channel is the consumption-capital ratio
fd in the DM. Intuitively, a higher ination increases the cost of holding money, thereby
reducing the real money balance held by households and the value of goods traded in the
DM. As a result, capital demand is depressed reducing the growth rate.
The second channel is endogenous labor supply, which is standard in traditional monetary
growth models. Intuitively, a decrease in labor supply reduces the marginal product of capital
thereby reducing capital accumulation and economic growth. To separate the consumption
and labor-supply e¤ects, we consider the limiting case  ! 0.
lim
!0
g =  +
1   + (1  )(1  )
1 +B[(1 + )=   (1  )]=(2) + (1  )  1, (34)
where we have used f 1=d = = =[(1 + )=   (1   )] from (27). Therefore, even when the
search-and-matching monetary growth model approaches the case with inelastic labor supply,
ination continues to have a detrimental e¤ect on economic growth via the consumption-
capital ratio in the DM. This result stands in stark contrast to the canonical endogenous
growth model with a CIA constraint on consumption, in which ination has no e¤ect on
economic growth under inelastic labor supply.16
Proposition 2 A higher money growth rate  reduces economic growth through the consumption-
capital ratio fd in the DM.
Before we proceed to analyze the welfare e¤ects of ination, it would be helpful to briey
present the equilibrium allocations under a special case of complete capital depreciation
(i.e.,  = 1). In this case, the DM consumption-capital ratio fd in (27) remains unchanged;
however, aggregate labor h in (30) nicely simplies to
h =

A(1  )

B +
22
1 +    + 

, (30a)
which is increasing in  because 1 +    > 0. Given (30a), we can simply express the CM
consumption-capital ratio as fc = B=(Ah1 ), which is decreasing in . Finally, the growth
rate g in (33) simplies to
g = 

1 +
(1  )2
22 +B (1 +    + )

h   1, (33a)
16In the previous version of this study, we provide an example of this model; see Chu et al. (2012).
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which is increasing in . Intuitively, as the matching probability  increases, households
have more incentives to accumulate capital, which in turn increases the equilibrium growth
rate.
Next, we examine the welfare e¤ects of monetary policy under the general case of in-
complete capital depreciation (i.e.,  2 (0; 1)). In this two-sector search model, households
engage in two types of economic activities in the DM and the CM every period. On the
balanced growth path, the lifetime utility U of households that includes the utility from the
CM and the expected utility from the DM can be expressed as
(1  )U =  ln q0   

q0
k0
1=
| {z }
DM
+B lnx0   Ah| {z }
CM
+
(B + )
1   ln(1 + g)| {z }
growth
. (35)
Substituting q0 = fdk0 and x0 = fck0 into (35) and then normalizing initial k0 to unity, (35)
simplies to
(1  )U =  ln fd   f 1=d +B ln fc   Ah+
(B + )
1   ln(1 + g). (36)
Di¤erentiating (36) with respect to  yields
(1  )@U
@
=

fd
 
1  f
1=
d

!
@fd
@
 
+
B
fc
@fc
@
+
  A@h
@
 
+
(B + )
(1  )(1 + g)
@g
@
 
, (37)
where f 1=d = < 1 from (27) because  >    1. A higher money growth rate (a) decreases
the consumption-capital ratio fd in the DM, (b) increases the consumption-capital ratio fc
in the CM, (c) decreases labor supply h in the CM, and (d) decreases economic growth g.
E¤ects (a) and (d) hurt welfare, whereas e¤ects (b) and (c) improve welfare. Although it
appears that the overall e¤ect of money growth on welfare is ambiguous, we show below that
higher money growth is in fact detrimental to social welfare.
Comparing the equilibrium allocations and the rst-best allocations, we nd that (a)
fd < f

d , (b) fc > f

c , (c) h < h
, and (d) g < g, where the variables with superscript *
denote rst-best allocations.17 In other words, there is too little consumption in the DM
due to the cost of holding money. In the CM, there is too much consumption and too
little labor supply due to capital externality. Finally, the equilibrium growth rate is also
suboptimally low. Therefore, increasing the money growth rate that forces the equilibrium
allocations to deviate further from the rst-best allocations is detrimental to welfare. In other
words, decreasing the money growth rate improves welfare, and the Friedman rule (given by
 !    1) is optimal in this model. However, although the Friedman rule is optimal, it
does not achieve the rst-best allocations due to the presence of capital externality.18
17In Appendix D, we derive the rst-best allocations of the search model and prove these inequalities.
18It is useful to note that the Friedman rule is not always optimal under price taking in the search model.
For example, Rocheteau and Wright (2005) show that the Friedman rule is not optimal when there exist
search externalities.
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Proposition 3 A higher money growth rate  reduces social welfare, and the Friedman rule
is optimal but does not achieve the rst-best allocations due to capital externality.
4 Quantitative analysis
In this section, we calibrate the model in order to perform a numerical investigation on the
e¤ects of ination on social welfare. We consider two policy objectives (a) price stability
(or equivalently, zero ination) and (b) the Friedman rule. Both of these policy objectives
are commonly analyzed in the literature; see for example, Dotsey and Ireland (1996), Lucas
(2000), Lagos and Wright (2005) and Aruoba et al. (2011). Furthermore, we compare the
welfare e¤ects of ination from the endogenous growth model to those from an exogenous
growth model. To consider exogenous growth, we follow Waller (2011) to assume an exoge-
nous technological progress; in other words, zt in (9) increases according to an exogenous
growth rate gz  _zt=zt.19
4.1 Empirical estimation
To facilitate the subsequent calibration, we rst provide an empirical estimation of the
e¤ects of ination on economic growth. Early studies by Kormendi and Meguire (1985), De
Gregorio (1993) and Fischer (1993) provide empirical evidence to show that ination has
a direct negative e¤ect on long-run economic growth as well as an indirect negative e¤ect
via the reduction of capital investment. Here we use recent cross-country panel data20 to
estimate the following regressions:
git = 1Iit + 2it 1 +  Xit + "it,
Iit = !1it 1 + 
Xit + it,
where git denotes the growth rate of real GDP in country i at time t, Iit denotes capital
investment as a percentage of GDP, and it 1 denotes the ination rate of consumer price
index.21 Xit is a vector of the following control variables: (a) a constant, (b) country xed
e¤ects, (c) year xed e¤ects, (d) export as a percentage of GDP, and (e) government spending
as a percentage of GDP. We consider data of 172 countries from 1981 to 2011. The total
e¤ects of ination on economic growth is @git=@it 1 = 2 + 1!1, where 2 captures the
direct e¤ect of it 1 on git, and 1!1 captures the indirect e¤ect of it 1 on git via Iit.
Upon obtaining an estimate of @git=@it 1, we will then include this empirical moment in
our calibration in the next subsection. Table 1 presents the summary statistics of the data.
Table 2 reports the regression results. The estimate of 2 is -0.0130 with a t-statistics of
-3.101, whereas the estimate of 1!1 is -0.0043 with a t-statistics of -5.002.
22
19In an unpublished appendix (see Appendix E), we provide the derivations of equilibrium allocations
under exogenous growth.
20Data source: The World Bank DataBank.
21We lag ination by one period in order to reduce the problem of reverse casuality.
22This t-statistics is computed using the delta method.
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics
Mean Standard
Deviation
Real GDP Growth (%) 2.343 4.521
Lagged Ination (%) 11.486 19.904
Investment/GDP (%) 23.214 8.110
Govt Expenditure/GDP (%) 15.783 6.003
Export/GDP (%) 39.366 27.002
Observations 3550
Table 2: Cross-country panel regression resultsy
Real GDP Growth Investment/GDP
Investment/GDP (%) 0.1304***
(0.0126)
Lagged Ination (%) -0.0130*** -0.0326***
(0.0042) (0.0057)
Govt Expenditure/GDP (%) -0.1180*** 0.0081
(0.0217) (0.0297)
Export/GDP (%) 0.0419*** -0.0223**
(0.0077) (0.0105)
Constant -1.3684* 27.7857***
(0.7312) (0.8786)
Country Fixed E¤ects Yes Yes
Year Fixed E¤ects Yes Yes
Overall R2 0.1487 0.0130
Observations 3550 3550
yStandard errors in parentheses. *, ** and ***, respectively, denote signicance at
the 10%, 5% and 1% levels.
4.2 Calibration
We begin by characterizing a benchmark economy, in which each structural parameter is
either set to a conventional value or matched to an empirical moment computed using long-
run data from 1959 to 2011 in the US economy. In the endogenous growth model, the
discount factor  is set to 0.952 to match an annual discount rate  of 5%.23 The capital-share
parameter  is set to 0.3, which implies a labor share  = 1  of 0.7. We consider an initial
money growth rate of 7.3%, so that the annual ination rate of consumer price index is 4.0%
when the economy grows at an annual growth rate of 3.2%. As for the capital depreciation
rate, we calibrate  by matching the investment-capital ratio of 0.07. The leisure parameter
23We consider a relatively high discount rate in order to be conservative. If we consider a lower discount
rate, the di¤erence in the welfare cost of ination between the endogenous-growth and exogenous-growth
models would be even more dramatic because decreasing the discount rate magnies the positive e¤ect of a
higher growth rate on social welfare.
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A is set to 5.042, so that the long-run growth rate is 3.2%. The consumption parameter B
is set to 1.588 to match the money-consumption ratio of 0.257 in the US using M1 as the
measure of money as is standard in the literature. As for the matching probability , we
calibrate it by matching @g=@ = 2 + 1!1 =  0:0173 from our regression estimates. The
calibrated value of  = 0:091 is within the range of values considered in the literature; for
example, Aruoba et al. (2011) consider a value of  = 0:10. Given this calibrated value of
, the interest elasticity of money demand is  =  0:566, which is also with in the range of
values considered in the literature; for example, Berentsen et al. (2011) consider  =  0:556.
As for the exogenous growth model, we consider a similar set of parameter values. In this
case, the exogenous growth model is also able to match the same set of empirical moments.
Table 3a summarizes the parameter values. As for equilibrium values of the key variables,
we report them in Table 3b. The consumption-capital ratio of 0.335 and the capital-output
ratio of 2.467 from the calibration are in line with empirical moments in the US economy.
Table 3a: Benchmark parameter values24
Parameter      A B 
Targets - 1     @g=@ g m=(pc) I=k
Target values 0.300 0.700 0.050 0.040  0.0173 0.032 0.257 0.070
Endogenous growth 0.300 0.700 0.952 0.073 0.091 5.042 1.588 0.038
Exogenous growth 0.300 0.700 0.952 0.073 0.092 5.064 1.595 0.038
Table 3b: Benchmark values of variables
Variable g  h  fd fc I=k c=k k=y
Endogenous growth 0.032 0.040 0.268  0.566 0.423 0.328 0.070 0.335 2.467
Exogenous growth 0.032 0.040 0.268  0.566 0.424 0.327 0.070 0.335 2.467
4.3 Numerical results
Given the above parameter values, we consider the following policy experiments. First,
we lower  from 0.073 to a value that achieves zero ination. This value is 0.033 in the
endogenous growth model and 0.032 in the exogenous growth model. In this case, the
ination rate decreases from 4.0% to 0% in both models. As for the Friedman rule, we lower
 from 0.073 to -0.048, so that the nominal interest rate decreases and approaches zero.
In Table 4, we report the results, which are expressed in percent changes of the variables,
except for g and U . The changes in g are expressed in percentage point, and the changes in
U are expressed in the usual equivalent variations in consumption.
24Because the growth rate of technology gz is a parameter under exogenous growth, we choose a value of
A such that the calibrated value of h is the same as in the endogenous growth model. As for the matching
probability, we choose a value of  such that the calibrated value of  is also the same as in the endogenous
growth model.
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Table 4: Growth and welfare e¤ects of a lower 
fd fc h g U
(%) (%) (%) (%) (%)
Zero ination
Endogenous growth 16.438  0.055 0.183 0.069 1.589
Exogenous growth 16.068  0.580 0.103 - 0.572
The Friedman rule
Endogenous growth 84.149  0.313 1.050 0.394 7.884
Exogenous growth 78.705  3.159 0.575 - 1.790
In Table 4, we see that reducing the money growth rate has the following e¤ects. First, it
raises the supply of labor h in both models; however, the labor-supply e¤ect is much larger
in the endogenous growth model than in the exogenous growth model. Second, it also raises
the consumption-capital ratio fd in both models. The larger labor supply h and the higher
consumption-capital ratio fd serve to increase economic growth in the endogenous growth
model, but they do not increase economic growth in the exogenous growth model.
Comparing fd and h under zero ination and the Friedman rule, we see that the
increases in both fd and h are disproportionately larger under Friedman rule than under
zero ination. From (27) and (30a), we see that both fd and h are decreasing and convex
functions in , and this property has the following implications on the growth and welfare
e¤ects of ination. We nd that the convexity carries over to the growth rate g, which is
also a decreasing and convex function in . In Figure 1, we plot welfare changes against
the money growth rate and see that the convexity in g in the endogenous growth model
is also reected in welfare U because the growth e¤ect is numerically the most important
component of the welfare e¤ect in the endogenous growth model.
Figure 1: The welfare e¤ects of ination under benchmark parameter values
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Given that the welfare e¤ect of ination is approximately linear in the exogenous growth
model, the di¤erence in the welfare costs of ination across the two models is increasing in
the size of the change in the money growth rate. In the case of zero ination, we nd that
the welfare gain of 1.589% in the endogenous growth model is almost three times as large as
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the welfare gain of 0.572% in the exogenous growth model.25 In the case of Friedman rule,
the welfare gain of 7.884% in the endogenous growth model is over four times as large as the
welfare gain of 1.790% in the exogenous growth model. The reasons why the endogenous
growth model features a much larger welfare e¤ect of ination than the exogenous growth
model are as follows. First, the equilibrium growth rate increases as the money growth rate
decreases, whereas the balanced growth rate is constant in the exogenous growth model.26
Second, Table 4 shows that as a result of a higher money growth rate, the consumption-
capital ratio fc in the CM falls by much more in the exogenous growth model than in the
endogenous growth model. Finally, Table 4 also shows that labor supply h increases by much
less under exogenous growth than under endogenous growth.
Given that the matching probability  is the key parameter in determining the magnitude
of the welfare e¤ects of ination, we perform a robustness check by varying the value of 
while holding other parameter values constant. We report the results for  2 f0:05; 0:2g in
Figures 2 and 3, in which we see a similar pattern as before. In fact, considering a wide
range of values of  2 (0; 0:5), we nd that the endogenous growth model features larger
welfare e¤ects of ination than the exogenous growth model in all cases. Furthermore, we
nd that the welfare e¤ect of ination is more sensitive to the value of  under endogenous
growth than under exogenous growth.
Figure 2: The welfare e¤ects of ination under  = 0:05
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5 Conclusion
In this study, we have analyzed the growth and welfare e¤ects of ination in a search-and-
matching monetary endogenous growth model. We nd that modelling economic growth
as an endogenous process amplies the welfare e¤ect of ination. Furthermore, the channel
through which ination a¤ects economic growth in the search-and-matching model is di¤erent
25We focus on steady-state welfare in the exogenous growth model. Taking into account transition dy-
namics in the exogenous growth model would make its welfare e¤ects even smaller.
26In the exogenous growth model, it is the balanced growth level of capital that is a¤ected by the money
growth rate, but this level e¤ect is not as strong as the growth e¤ect under endogenous growth.
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Figure 3: The welfare e¤ects of ination under  = 0:20
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from the traditional CIA model. Therefore, given the relative tractability of recent vintages
of the search-and-matching model, it could be a fruitful direction for future research to
further revisit the interesting implications of monetary policy on economic growth and social
welfare in variants of the search model. For example, it would be interesting to consider
the welfare e¤ects of ination under di¤erent pricing mechanisms in a search-and-matching
monetary endogenous growth model.27 Finally, we acknowledge that by having a degenerate
distribution of money held by households, our numerical results on the welfare e¤ects of
ination could be biased upwards;28 therefore, it would also be interesting to take into
account the distributional e¤ect of ination in future studies.
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Appendix A: Bargaining in the search model
In this appendix, we show that proportional bargaining is incompatible with balanced
growth unless we focus on a special case in which buyers obtain all surplus.29 If a buyer with
state
 
mbt ; k
b
t

is matched with a seller with state (mst ; k
s
t ), then a proportional bargaining
problem, in which the buyers gains from trade are a xed share  of the trade surplus can
be expressed as
Max
qt
ln qt +W (m
b
t   dt; kbt )| {z }
buyers payo¤
  W (mbt ; kbt )| {z }
buyers threat point
= 

ln qt   e

qt
zt
;
kst
zt

| {z }
trade surplus
; (A1)
subject to the budget constraint dt  mbt . Using (7) and substituting dt = mbt into (A1), the
bargaining condition for special goods is
(1  ) ln qt = Am
b
t
ptwt
  e

qt
zt
;
kst
zt

: (A2)
In (A2), qt is increasing overtime due to economic growth whereas mbt= (ptwt), qt=zt and
kst =zt are stationary on a balanced growth path. As a result, the bargaining condition is
incompatible with balanced growth unless the buyer obtains all surplus (i.e.,  = 1); however,
under this special case, ination has no e¤ect on economic growth because sellers obtain zero
surplus in the DM.
Appendix B: Consumption in the DM
In this appendix, we show that it is optimal for the buyers to spend all their money to
consume special goods in the DM. Di¤erentiating (15) with respect to qbt yields
@V b(mt; kt)
@qbt
=
1
qbt
  eptWm(mt   eptqbt ; kt) = 1qbt   Beptptxt , (B1)
where the second equality follows from (7). The second-order condition shows that V b(:) is
globally concave in qbt and reaches a maximum at q
b
t = ptxt= (Bept). In what follows, we show
that qbt = mt=ept < ptxt= (Bept) implying that the money constraint must be binding because
qbt < ptxt= (Bept) , @V b(:)=@qbt > 0. Setting qbt = qst = qt and zt = kt = kt in (10) and (19),
we have
B
eptqt
ptxt
=
1


qt
zt
1=
, (B2)
where qt=zt = fd. From (27), we know that f
1=
d = < 1 because  >    1. Therefore,eptqt = mt < ptxt=B.
29The same result can be shown for the case of generalized Nash bargaining.
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Appendix C: Dynamic properties of the search model
In this appendix, we show that the economy in the search model always jumps to a unique
and locally stable balanced growth path given a stationary sequence of monetary policy (i.e.,
t =  for all t). Combining (17) and (19) and using (10), we can obtain
B
mt
ptxt
=
1


qt
kt
1=
. (C1)
Here we dene fd;t  qt=kt as the ratio between consumption and capital in the DM and
make use of (5), (17), (20), (25) and (C1) to derive
(1 + )

fd;t
fd;t+1
1=
= 
"
1 +  +

f
1=
d;t+1
#
. (C2)
Combining (3), (5), (21), (23) and (24) and using (10) to yield
kt+1
kt

ht+1
ht
 1
= 
h
1 + ht+1    +

A

h 1t+1 f
1=
d;t+1
i
. (C3)
In addition, the capital-accumulation equation is kt+1=kt = yx;t=kt   xt=kt + 1    = ht  
Bh 1t =A+ 1  . Applying this equation to (C3) yields

ht  
Bh 1t
A
+ 1  

ht+1
ht
 1
= 
h
1 + ht+1    +

A

h 1t+1 f
1=
d;t+1
i
. (C4)
Log-linearizing (C2) and (C4) around the steady-state equilibrium yields the following
deterministic system:
log (ht+1=h)
log (fd;t+1=fd)

=

a11 a12
a21 a22

| {z }
Jacobian matrix

log (ht=h)
log (fd;t=fd)

, (C5)
where
a11 =
h +  (1  ) (1   + h) + (1  )

B + h 1f 1=d

h 1=A
()h +  (1  ) (1   + h) > 1,
a12 =   ()h
 1f 1=d =A
()h +  (1  ) (1   + h)

1 + 
 (1  )

< 0,
a21 = 0,
a22 =
1 + 
 (1  ) > 1,
where we have used  >  (1  )  1. Let 1 and 2 be the two characteristic roots of the
dynamic system. The trace and determinant of Jacobian are given by
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Tr = 1 + 2 = a11 + a22 > 0, (C6)
Det = 12 = a11a22 > 0. (C7)
As indicated in (C6) and (C7), the dynamic system exists two unstable characteristic roots
(1 = a11 > 1 and 2 = a22 > 1). Given h and fd are jump variables, two unstable
characteristic roots imply that the economy jumps to a unique and locally stable balanced
growth path.
Appendix D: First-best allocations of the search model
In this appendix, we derive the rst-best allocations of the search model and compare
them with the equilibrium allocations. The planner chooses all quantities directly, taking all
relevant information into account. Here money is not essential. The planners problem is
J(kt) = max
qt;xt;ht;kt+1
(
 ln qt   

qt
kt
1=
+B lnxt   Aht + J(kt+1)
)
, (D1)
subject to the capital-accumulation equation
kt+1 = kth

t   xt + (1  )kt. (D2)
From standard dynamic optimization, the optimality conditions for qt and ht are respectively
qt
kt
= , (D3)
Ah1 t

xt
kt

= B. (D4)
The intertemporal optimality condition for capital accumulation is
B
xt
= Jk(kt+1), (D5)
and the envelope condition is
Jk(kt) =

kt

qt
kt
1=
+
B
xt
(1   + ht ). (D6)
Combining (D5) and (D6), we can derive the rst-best balanced growth rate g given by
g  xt+1
xt
  1 = 

1 + (h)    + 
B
f c (f

d )
1=

  1, (D7)
where f c  (x=k) and f d  (q=k) denote the rst-best consumption-capital ratios for
general goods and special goods respectively. From (D3), we can obtain
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(f d )
1=

= 1. (D8)
As for f c , combining (D7) and (D2) yields
f c =
(1  ) (h) + (1  )(1  )
1 +  (f d )
1= = (B)
. (D9)
Rewriting (D4) yields
A(h)1 f c = B: (D10)
Equations (D7), (D8), (D9) and (D10) determine the rst-best allocations fg; f d ; f c ; hg.
Comparing (D8) and (27) shows that fd < f d because  >    1. Substituting (D10)
into (D9) yields
f c =
(1  )[B=(Af c )]=(1 ) + (1  )(1  )
1 +  (f d )
1= = (B)
, (D11)
where (f d )
1= = is determined by (D8). Substituting (30) into (29) yield
fc =
(1  )[B=(Afc)]=(1 ) + (1  )(1  )
1 + f
1=
d = (B)
, (D12)
where f 1=d = is determined by (27). Comparing (D11) and (D12) shows that fc > f

c because
fd < f

d and  < 1. Given fc > f

c , (D10) and (30) imply that h < h
. Rewriting (D2) yields
g =
kt+1
kt
  1 = h   fc   . (D13)
Given that h < h and fc > f c , it must be the case that g < g
.
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Appendix E (not for publication): Exogenous technological progress
In this unpublished appendix, we provide the derivations of equilibrium allocations under
exogenous growth. We follow Waller (2011) to assume an exogenous technological progress;
in other words, zt in (9) increases according to an exogenous growth rate gz  (zt+1   zt) =zt.
Based on (4), (10) and (21), the balanced growth rate of xt can be expressed as
gx  xt+1
xt
  1 = 

1 + r    + 
B
fcf
1=
d s
(1 )=

  1, (E1)
where r = s 1h from (23). On the balanced-growth path, variables such as output,
consumption, capital and real money balance, grow at the same rate as zt (i.e., gx = gz).
The variable s  k=z denotes the capital-technology ratio and can be determined using the
following condition
s 1h = fc +  + gz, (E2)
which uses the capital-accumulation equation kt+1 = yx;t   xt + (1  ) kt.
As for fd and fc, we use analogous inference as in section 3 to obtain
fd = s
 1


R + 

, (E3)
where R denotes the nominal interest rate and is given by R = (1 + ) =   1 at the steady
state. We make use of (E1), (E2) and (E3) to derive
fc =
B


(1 + gz) =   [1   +  ( + gz)]
B + 2= (R + )

, (E4)
which is positive because (1 + gz) = > 1 + gz > 1 + gz   (1  ).
Using (3) and (24), equation (E2) can be rearranged as
s 1h =
 + gz
1  B= (Ah) . (E5)
Combining (E2), (E4) and (E5), the equilibrium allocation of h is
h =
B
A

1 + ( + gz)

B
 B + 2= (R + )
(1 + gz) =   [1   +  ( + gz)]

, (E6)
which is also positive. We substitute (E4) and (E6) into (E2) to obtain the equilibrium
allocation of s as
s =

B


(1 + gz) =   [1   +  ( + gz)]
B + 2= (R + )
+  + gz
1=( 1)
(E7)


B
A
=(1 )
1 + ( + gz)

B
 B + 2= (R + )
(1 + gz) =   [1   +  ( + gz)]
=(1 )
.
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Substituting (E7) into (E3), the equilibrium allocation of fd can be expressed as
fd =

B


(1 + gz) =   [1   +  ( + gz)]
B + 2= (R + )
+  + gz

(E8)


A
B
 
(1 + gz) =   [1   +  ( + gz)]
(R + ) [(1 + gz) =   (1  )] +  ( + gz)2=B

.
As for social welfare, the lifetime utility of households on the balanced growth path is
(1  )U =  ln q0   

q0
k0
1= 
k0
z0
(1 )=
+B lnx0   Ah+ (B + )
1   ln(1 + gz). (E9)
Substituting q0 = sfdz0 and x0 = sfcz0 into (E9) and then normalizing initial z0 to unity,
we simplify (E9) to
(1  )U = ( +B) ln s+  ln fd   f 1=d s(1 )= +B ln fc   Ah, (E10)
where we have dropped the exogenous growth rate gz.
In the rest of this appendix, we consider the rst-best allocations under exogenous growth
and compare them with the equilibrium allocations. The planners problem is
J(kt) = max
qt;xt;ht;kt+1
(
 ln qt   

qt
zt
1= 
kt
zt
 =
+B lnxt   Aht + J(kt+1)
)
, (E11)
subject to the capital-accumulation equation kt+1 = z1 t k

t h

t  xt+(1 )kt. From standard
dynamic optimization, the optimality conditions for qt and ht are respectively
qt
kt

kt
zt
1 
= , (E12)
Ah1 t

xt
kt

kt
zt
1 
= B. (E13)
The intertemporal optimality condition for capital accumulation is
B
xt
= Jk(kt+1), (E14)
and the envelope condition is
Jk(kt) =

kt

qt
kt
1= 
kt
zt
(1 )=
+
B
xt
"
1 + 

kt
zt
 1
ht   
#
. (E15)
Combining (E14) and (E15), we can obtain the balanced growth rate of xt given by
gx =
xt+1
xt
  1 = 

1 +  (s) 1 (h)    + 
B
f c (f

d )
1= (s)(1 )=

  1, (E16)
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where s  (k=z), f c  (x=k) and f d  (q=k) denote the rst-best capital-technology ratio
and the rst-best consumption-capital ratios for general goods and special goods respectively.
On the balanced growth path, the growth rate of xt is equal to the growth rate of zt (i.e.,
gx = gz). Using (E12), we obtain
(f d )
1= (s)(1 )= = . (E17)
In addition, the capital-accumulation equation can be rearranged as
(s) 1 (h) = f c +  + gz. (E18)
Based on (E16), (E17) and (E18), the rst-best consumption-capital for general goods can
be expressed as
f c =
B


(1 + gz) =   [1   +  ( + gz)]
B + 

. (E19)
Combining (E13), (E18) and (E19) yields
h =
B
A

1 + ( + gz)

B
 B + 
(1 + gz) =   [1   +  ( + gz)]

. (E20)
Substituting (E19) and (E20) into (E18), we obtain
s =

B


(1 + gz) =   [1   +  ( + gz)]
B + 
+  + gz
1=( 1)
(E21)


B
A
=(1 )
1 + ( + gz)

B
 B + 
(1 + gz) =   [1   +  ( + gz)]
=(1 )
.
As for f d , we make use of (E21) and (E17) to obtain
f d =

B


(1 + gz) =   [1   +  ( + gz)]
B + 

+  + gz

(E22)


A
B
 
(1 + gz) =   [1   +  ( + gz)]
[(1 + gz) =   (1  )] +  ( + gz)=B

.
Comparing the rst-best allocations with equilibrium allocations, we nd that fd = f d ,
fc = f

c , s = s
 and h = h if the nominal interest rate R is equal to zero; therefore, the
Friedman rule holds in the exogenous growth model.
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